The laws of nation are not the Laws of State

The laws of nation are not the Laws of State







16 August 2019

Understanding Jesus is to understand the father and his contract with man from which is born the laws of nation. 

At age 30 Jesus took up a path in full consciousness, in which he would refute and not take upon himself fake nor false. He gave us maxims to follow, three of which are important to our topic :

The kingdom of god is within.
Render unto Caesar that which is Caesars.
He who is without sin cast the first stone.

The first maxim is clear, if you seek the kingdom of the father, hear your heart above all else in the world of Person which is secondary.
The second and so misunderstood, tells us to play no part in the realm of Caesar, aka, Commerce not to be understood as trade.
The third, seek only self judgement so you can understand your own predicament and move ever to the dance of the heart which is natural to all man.

Jesus presented the spoken word, therefore he was operating in the jurisdiction of natural law as opposed to the Laws of State which is an entity born of nation and is formulated in the written word. As such his only accepted authority was the law as given by the father which came from within, in so doing he reestablished the law and presented it to man. As history tells us through the narrative, in negating the authority of the State as having authority above man, the State moved to kill him.

Definition : nation

noun : nation; plural noun : nations

A large body of people united by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular country or territory.

The above definition clearly defines itself.

In todays definition the word wizards have conjoined nation as equal with the separate and subordinate entity we call the State.

The State is born of the nation, it is an administrative body to ensure the upkeep of nation, it is subservient to the nation, hence the term Public Servant for those who take up office within the State.

The definition presents a distinction between the jurisdiction of Man and Land, and the jurisdiction of the State. Fascism Doctrine and Institutions, by Benito Mussolini


If we are to define the unwritten laws of nation we can present as the overriding principle that one should love your neighbour as yourself. In order to fulfil this maxim we can consider the following as unwritten laws :

do no harm
do not steal
do not lie

This system is called the unwritten constitution of England and remains the highest jurisdiction in force. Given today we have many jurisdictions of Law you have to invoke the unwritten jurisdiction by language and through the written word, by applying the correct grammar.

In England under the above platform, we formed a high trust high commons we called the common law in which we afforded those principles to all our relations with our neighbours until they proved contrary. If contrary behaviour presented itself we held the right to defend ourselves and property in the immediate or to look to the judiciary to arbitrate a claim of wrong or debt. Everything would change from 1215 AD.

After the introduction of a lesser body of Laws formed by the Norman Knights, then called Barons, and, with many of the changes carried out while the aristocracy were involved in Crusade, the State formed a body of Case Law we called the English Common Law which exists in the jurisdiction of Maritime Law and deals in contracts written, or the world of paper, from which was formed the Provisions of Oxford in 1258[1] in which they could by-pass the king and common law and deal only in agreements on paper between themselves, determined in what we call a Parliament.

During the 12th and early 13th centuries the law was taught in the City of London, primarily by the clergy. But a papal bull in 1218 prohibited the clergy from practising in the secular courts, where the English common law system operated, as opposed to the Roman civil law favoured by the Church. As a result, law began to be practised and taught by laymen instead of by clerics.

In 1272 Edward I became King of England and moved against the Templars who had been invited to Scotland by Robert the Bruce. He ruled unit his death in 1307. As a result of opposing the Templar Knights, Edward expelled the Jews in an Edict of Expulsion in July 1290 to cut off their finance.

In the earliest centuries of their existence, beginning with the 14th century, the Inns of Court were of a sizeable number of buildings or precincts where Attorners lived, trained and operated their profession and are synonymous with the Knights Templar.[2]

The Inns of Court as private and unincorporated clubs have been systematically subverted from the top as the Aristocracy borrowed and thus became indebted to outside financiers, who birthed a body of law understood only by the elect, from which they could claim huge fees and levy fines and compensation in goods or coin against the common man and the remaining lands held in common. This can be seen as a confounding of the common language to form a hierarchy separate from the common man.

After the English Civil War, 1642-1651, the Templars in Scotland, through the Whigs, formed a dictatorship Parliament under Oliver Cromwell which destroyed the power and authority of the Monarch. Cromwell demolished the Laws on Usury, which until then had allowed up to 2.5% among the clergy and opened the gates to the Byzantium Jewish moneylenders into England.[3]

Everything would change to wars of conquest with the introduction of the Hanoverians.

The outside financiers, many from Frankfurt, France and Holland yet having root in Byzantium, became the Aristocracy, this took a huge leap from the timeframe 1812 when the House Rothschild bailed out the Monarch. Having destroyed the European monarchies beholden to Rome after 1815, and securing the British stock market, in 1825 the House Rothschild formed the Law Society which again had its own language we today call Legalese, this would further remove the State and law outside the reach of the population.[A]

The records of civil registration as opposed to the Parish registrations, in England & Wales, commenced on 1 July 1837, and relate to the birth, marriage and death of a Person, not a man. In Scotland records began in 1855 and in Ireland in 1864 (n.b. Irish non-Catholic marriages were recorded from 1845).

The subjugation of the realm into the hands of the financier was born of the Usury agreed by the hierarchy of the nation post Civil War shifting Commerce into the hands of the Bank of England, this enabled the hijacking of the State by Usurers and shifted the debt onto the Citizen through the issuance of Title created by Government, (the Birth Certificate) with the government becoming the administrator of a huge social State to which the population became Legally tied by deception. From that Title they were issued a Social Security Number. The public became members of a concentration camp.

According to Edward Ellis the remedy to our dilemma can be achieved within the Legal framework by invoking the Crown to action.

The Equity Monarchy Trusts govern Parliament Session Powers for the United Kingdom Parliament. They fell into disuse for 45 years when the Politicians developed the European Constitution. It vested Dictator Powers in the State.[4]

Both the yoke to the State and disuse of the Equity Trusts occurred after World War II, first with the introduction of the National Health Service from which they achieved the ability to trespass on the human body with the scientifically created synthetic chemistry birthed in the Concentration camps under the Third Reich.[5] This diverted the attention of the populace to all things State as the font of all goodness.

Secondary to that deception the Tavistock[6] and Frankfurt Group[7] birthed the introduction of LSD into popular culture (and in the tap water) which attacked the psychological abilities of the populace to return back to the pre war intellect.[8] This was then passed on to the future generations until as we stand today, our children have been demolished spiritually through corporate education and a lack of morality handed down from the chemically damaged post war generation.[9]

Having stated all of the above it is important we understand that it matters not how far down the path of darkness one falls, the path of redemption is available to all individuals. As such to follow a path that reverses insanity as a personal choice, then by definition of that fact, as more people change back to morality you open the door to redemption of nation.


First, I would have you consider that language when speaking and grammar when writing, are the key to asserting jurisdiction, that when you understand this concept you can translate all things into the correct language and to which jurisdiction you are invoking or is being invoked by another party, thus the operating authority in the matter at hand is revealed.

Jurisdiction from the Latin jus, iris meaning law and dicere meaning to speak.

Second, that we understand land and man are the same word. Man is of the earth and classed as a being of clay, clay being his body in which we hold the trinity of creation.

These forces exist within you’re earthly body as is described in the Bible as man being in the image of god.

A man, in the image of god, is subject only to the judgement of god, no thing can come between that relationship. This is natural law as ordained in the Biblical text. That we each understand what is correct and what is not as our natural state of being.

Secondary to that jurisdiction is the Ecclesiastical Law which pertains to a Person under the canon law. This jurisdiction is recognised in the record and title created with the record of only of the Christian names. There is no Surname which is the Surety, the trap.

Third is Civil Law, formed from the nation to administer the mechanics of the nations infrastructure and operates under Statutory Regulations for those who take employment within it.

The Live Birth Record, is the title the State recognises you in the Ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
The Birth Certificate is a secondary title, taken from the Ecclesiastical title and in using it fixes you under Statutory Regulation as an employee of the Government, forsaking the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction under the canon because you become a ward of the State.


We then have Admiralty and Maritime Law which comes under the jurisdiction of Commercial Code, the child of Napoleon and his Byzantium cohorts.

The United Nations is an oxymoron as it should be called the United States because it is a conglomerate of the State of nations. Israel is a Nation State of Judaism while claiming to have origin of nation as of the Hebrew, therefore it is a deception. Both these platforms are moving to full control of legal authority under a system they call the Noahide Laws, the question is, for who?[10]

Rather than comment through the following body of information, I have presented the key to understanding jurisdiction as the above foreword.

Philosophical Distinction Between natural law and the Statutes of State

Let us examine Thomas Aquinas, the greatest of Christian philosophers as he instructs the difference between law and State Law.

Question 95. Human law

Its utility
Its origin
Its quality
Its division

Article 1. Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?

Objection 1. It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good thereby, as stated above (I-II:92:1). But men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame laws.

Objection 2. Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), “men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice.” But animate justice is better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.

Objection 3. Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions, as is evident from what has been stated above (Question 90, Articles 1 and 2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) : “Laws were made that in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm.” But these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human laws should be made.

I answer that, As stated above (I-II:63:1; I-II:94:3), man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of this training :

Since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), “as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and righteousness”; because man can use his reason to devise means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable to do.

Reply to Objection 1. Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.

Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), “it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges”: and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas those who sit in judgment of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.

Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men.

Reply to Objection 3. Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law “have necessarily to be committed to judges,” as the Philosopher says in the same passage: for instance, “concerning something that has happened or not happened,” and the like.
Article 2. Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?

Objection 1. It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “the legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference.” But those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural law.

Objection 2. Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above (I-II:94:4). Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong to the natural law.

Objection 3. Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “the natural just is that which is equally valid everywhere.” If therefore human laws were derived from the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all: which is clearly false.

Objection 4. Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural law. But “it is not possible to give the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers,” as the jurist says [Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat.]. Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.

On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): “Things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) “that which is not just seems to be no law at all”: wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above (I-II:91:2 ad 2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.

But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways : first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularised as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. that “one must not kill” may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that “one should do harm to no man”: while some are derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of nature.

Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law.

Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the natural law.

Reply to Objection 2. This argument avails for those things that are derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions.

Reply to Objection 3. The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people.

Reply to Objection 4. These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they see at once what is the best thing to decide.

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, “we ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their demonstrations.”
Article 3. Whether Isidore’s description of the quality of positive law is appropriate?

Objection 1. It would seem that Isidore’s description of the quality of positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): “Law shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for no private benefit, but for the common good.” Because he had previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions, saying that “law is anything founded on reason, provided that it foster religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the common weal.” Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to these.

Objection 2. Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De Offic. vii). Therefore after saying “honest” it was superfluous to add “just.”

Objection 3. Further, written law is condivided with custom, according to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in the definition of law that it is “according to the custom of the country.”

Objection 4. Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which is necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say both “necessary” and “useful.”

On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore.

I answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is twofold, viz. the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above (Article 2; I-II:93:3). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the jurist states [Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff., tit. iii; De Leg. et Senat.]. Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down, at first, three conditions; viz. that it “foster religion,” inasmuch as it is proportionate to the Divine law; that it be “helpful to discipline,” inasmuch as it is proportionate to the nature law; and that it “further the common weal,” inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of mankind.

All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three. For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he goes on to say that it should be “just, possible to nature, according to the customs of the country, adapted to place and time,” he implies that it should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends on first on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying “just”: secondly, it depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline should be adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account the ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not laid on children as adults); and should be according to human customs; since man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, “adapted to place and time.” The remaining words, “necessary, useful,” etc. mean that law should further the common weal: so that “necessity” refers to the removal of evils; “usefulness” to the attainment of good; “clearness of expression,” to the need of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself. And since, as stated above (I-II:90:2), law is ordained to the common good, this is expressed in the last part of the description.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Article 4. Whether Isidore’s division of human laws is appropriate?

Objection 1. It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he includes the “law of nations,” so called, because, as he says, “nearly all nations use it.” But as he says, “natural law is that which is common to all nations.” Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive human law, but rather under natural law.

Objection 2. Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ not formally but only materially. But “statutes, decrees of the commonalty, senatorial decrees,” and the like which he mentions (Etym. v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore they do not differ, except materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction: since it may go on to infinity. Therefore this division of human laws is not appropriate.

Objection 3. Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests and soldiers, so are there other human offices. Therefore it seems that, as this division includes “military law,” and “public law,” referring to priests and magistrates; so also it should include other laws pertaining to other offices of the state.

Objection 4. Further, those things that are accidental should be passed over. But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or that man. Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names of lawgivers, so that one be called the “Cornelian” law, another the “Falcidian” law, etc.

On the contrary, The authority of Isidore (Objection 1) suffices.

I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul either rational or irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and therefore animal is divided properly and of itself in respect of it’s being rational or irrational; but not in the point of it’s being white or black, which are entirely beside the notion of animal. Now, in the notion of human law, many things are contained, in respect of any of which human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it belongs to the notion of human law, to be derived from the law of nature, as explained above (Article 2). In this respect positive law is divided into the “law of nations” and “civil law”, according to the two ways in which something may be derived from the law of nature, as stated above (Article 2). Because, to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g. just buyings and selling, and the like, without which men cannot live together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2. But those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination, belong to the civil law, according as each state decides on what is best for itself.

Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the common good of the state. In this respect human law may be divided according to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for the common good: e.g. priests, by praying to God for the people; princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of the people. Wherefore certain special kinds of law are adapted to these men.

Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that one who governs the community of the state, as shown above (I-II:90:3). In this respect, there are various human laws according to the various forms of government. Of these, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 10) one is “monarchy,” i.e. when the state is governed by one; and then we have “Royal Ordinances.” Another form is “aristocracy,” i.e. government by the best men or men of highest rank; and then we have the “Authoritative legal opinions” [Responsa Prudentum] and “Decrees of the Senate” [Senatus consulta]. Another form is “oligarchy,” i.e. government by a few rich and powerful men; and then we have “Praetorian,” also called “Honorary,” law. Another form of government is that of the people, which is called “democracy,” and there we have “Decrees of the commonalty” [Plebiscita]. There is also tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, which, therefore, has no corresponding law. Finally, there is a form of government made up of all these, and which is the best: and in this respect we have law sanctioned by the “Lords and Commons,” as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4, seqq.).

Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human actions. In this respect, according to the various matters of which the law treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes named after their authors: thus we have the “Lex Julia” about adultery, the “Lex Cornelia” concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this way, not on account of the authors, but on account of the matters to which they refer.

Reply to Objection 1. The law of nations is indeed, in some way, natural to man, in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is derived from the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very remote from its premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless it is distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from the natural law which is common to all animals.

The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been said.

[1] 1258 The Provisions of Oxford
[2] The Crown Temple
[3] Oliver Cromwell
[4] The Corruption Remedy Process, Edward William Ellis
[5] Cancer Epidemic Due To The Introduction Of Viruses Through Vaccinations, SV-40 On Trial
[6] The Tavistock Institute Of Human Relations And The Destruction Of The West
[7] György Lukács And The Frankfurt School
[8] The Magic Mushroom And The Fake Evolution, Mind Control Inc
[9] ARK, Absolute Return For Kids
[10] History Of Freemasonry, Albert Gallatin Mackey, Vol II, The Prussian Knight, 21st Degree

[A] Protestant Lands
Next to the Muslim countries, the Protestant lands offered the best prospects for Marranos, for here too the Catholics were detested, and the Inquisition was a hated institution because it was no more tolerant of Protestants than Jews. In places like England and Germany, Marranos began their existence as titular Catholics and secret Jews before the Reformation. They continued in this double life long after those areas had broken with Rome, since the Protestant authorities were not eager to grant official acknowledgment to the Jews.

In Hamburg, destined to become one of the wealthiest and most productive Marrano centres, the settlement of Jews was not officially authorised until 1612 and Jewish public worship not until 1650. In England, where Jews had been expelled in 1290, the Marranos who originally settled in London and Bristol were never officially acknowledged as Jews, the question was simply ignored and Marranos were allowed to live undisturbed as practicing Jews. Actually this connivance, or de facto resettlement through official silence, proved salutary for the Jews, since the failure to grant official permission for their presence made it impossible to impose particular disabilities on them. From the middle of the 17th century at least, the Marranos were treated like all other nonconformist citizens. In 1664, the crown granted Jews an official charter of protection, thus further facilitating the development of the Marrano community. The ex-Marranos and their descendants continued to be the dominant element in British Jewry until the 19th century.

In Amsterdam, the Marranos did not arrive until around 1590, some 11 years after the Union of Utrecht (1579) and the birth of the United Provinces of the Netherlands as a Protestant State. Here, too, they had to wait until 1615 before Jewish settlement was officially authorised, but the Marranos in Amsterdam differed from those in other Protestant countries in that they openly practiced Judaism almost from the moment of their arrival. Thanks to the Marranos, Amsterdam became one of the greatest Jewish centres in the world in the 17th century; it had some of the finest academies and produced some of the greatest Jewish thinkers. During this time, Amsterdam even became known as “the Dutch Jerusalem.” The city was also a haven for oppressed Jews from places other than Spain and Portugal, including France in 1615 and Eastern Europe after the Chmielnicki massacres in 1648.
Marranos from Holland were among the first settlers in Surinam and Curacao, where a substantial Sephardi community came into being after 1650. Other former Marranos were also found in Barbados and in other parts of the West Indies, including Martinique and the Leeward Islands.

…A Marrano community was discovered by Samuel Schwartz in Portugal in 1917, and from time to time there emerge individuals or even groups who do not identify as Jews, but who have retained some of the practices and customs of the Marranos while unaware of their Jewish ancestry. The most active Marranos are in the mountainous border areas of the Iberian peninsula between Spain and Portugal, in towns such as Belmonte. Jewish outreach in these areas is achieving success in bringing them forward and restoring full Judaic practice, but many still fear burning or other persecution if they go public with their practices.

…”Crypto-Jew” has now become the more politically correct term, as opposed to Marrano, and refers to all Jews forced to adopt a certain religion and political philosophy while maintaining Jewish practices in secret. In modern times, outwardly Muslim Crypto-Jews are known to be in Iran, and Turkey. Some Hispanics and Latinos, such as Rita Moreno and Fidel Castro, have acknowledged their Marrano ancestry.


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